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within and across borders, these are frequently irregular and unpredictable. We define
these refugees’ ‘pragmatic mobilities’ as ‘the experience and practice ofmultiple, distinct
yet interconnectedmobilities,despite trying timesandunknowablecircumstances’, there-
by attending to the fractured (dis)junctures between these journeys as well as to their full
temporal and geographical scope. By setting the practice and experience of South
Sudanese refugees’ ongoing and everydaymobilities within wider personal and regional
historical perspectives,we argue that thediversitieswithin these refugees’ ‘pragmaticmo-
bility’practicesdemonstratepowerfulmanifestationsofagency.Weconsequentlyunder-
standthesemovementstobeessentialelementswithineveryday—yetcrucial—practicesto
gain andmaintain personal and collective control in otherwise uncertain contexts.
Keywords: agency, displacement, mobility, refugees, return migration, South Sudan,
Uganda
Introduction: Refugees, Mobility, and Agency Amid Unpredictability
In this article, we analyse the journeys of South Sudanese refugees residing in
Palabek Refugee Settlement (PRS) in northern Uganda through a mobilities-
focused lens, investigating the multi-directional and complex movements under-
taken by displaced people during and after conflict. Setting the practice and ex-
perience of mobility among South Sudanese refugees within wider personal and
Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 33, No. 4 VC The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.






/jrs/article/33/4/747/6133609 by guest on 12 M
ay 2021
regional historical perspectives, we demonstrate that the movements of South
Sudanese refugees disrupt simplistic discourses of return and repatriation.
Using the context of ongoing movements among people displaced by the
Second Sudanese War (1983–2005) and especially the recently concluded South
Sudanese Civil War (2013–18), we argue that the complexity and diversity of our
interlocutors’ varying mobility practices are particularly powerful manifestations
of agency amid unpredictability. That is, having personal histories of ‘enforced
domination, lived uncertainty, and extreme collective suffering’ (Finnström 2008:
189) and now living in a situation of ‘existential uncertainty bordering on crisis’
(O’Byrne 2017: 93), they seek to use their—often fragmented—mobilities to at
least allow for the possibility of greater existential control (and therefore cer-
tainty).We consequently understand these sometimes rather commonplacemove-
ments to be essential parts of everyday—yet crucial—practices to gain and
maintain personal and collective control in otherwise uncertain contexts.
For the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—the UN
body mandated to protect, manage, and assist the world’s growing refugee popu-
lace—‘repatriation’ refers to the movement of refugees from their country of exile
to that of their origin. However, in many instances, it is used as a form of discur-
sive shorthand to specificallymean ‘voluntary repatriation’: UNHCR’s preferred,
primary (and often unproblematized) ‘durable solution’, in which a refugee will-
ingly and permanently returns to their country of origin, ending their experience of
‘the refugee cycle’. Nonetheless, despite widespread repatriation across the globe
in the last several decades, little is known about refugees’ experiences of multiple
displacements or the diversity of their later movements and mobilities (cf.
Monsutti 2008; Grabska 2014: 205).
Mobility has become an essential part of the everyday and life-long trajectories
of many South Sudanese over the last several decades. This is especially true for
those living close to neighbouring countries or in fragile climate-effected or
conflict-ridden environments and was most apparent immediately following the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the Second Sudanese War in
January 2005. The repatriations which followed did not stop returnees from
moving back and forth across the region, however, and South Sudanese continued
to move throughout both the brief period of peace and over the course of the
recently concluded conflict. Recognition of the complexity surrounding these
movements is important, lest conflations between return and repatriation con-
tinue to inform local manifestations of the (inter)national refugee response. In
fact, as noted by Long (2010: 36; cf. Monsutti 2008: 59), not only do many
returned refugees continue to be mobility after their displacement ends but such
continuities should even be expected. After all, as Ramadan (2013: 70) has argued,
‘in the absence of a durable solution to refugee status, migration and transnational
networks may represent an “enduring” and effective livelihood strategy’.
This article explicitly builds upon previous work among (South) Sudanese
refugees in Uganda during or immediately following the Second Sudanese War
(cf. Allen 1996; Kaiser 2006, 2010; Hovil 2010). Almost all our interlocutors have
been refugees at least once before and, despite the recent violence in South Sudan,
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many continued tomove across the border as they had throughout their lives. For
many, ‘the leaving and coming back has been constant’ (Monsutti 2008: 59) and,
like the Afghanis with whom Monsutti worked as well as the South Sudanese
discussed by these earlier scholars, many of our interlocutors have moved much
the same during times of war as they did in periods of peace. Given such com-
plexity, knowledge about the current and former lives of refugee individuals is
crucial.
The factors impacting movement in this region have always been multifaceted,
determined by a diverse array of personal, familial, and communal concerns and
local, regional, and international contexts (cf. Kaiser 2010: 54–55). The dynamics
ofmany contemporary South Sudanese’s movementsmanifests ‘a continuation of
the mobility practices of earlier generations’ (Bjarnesen 2016: 61) as well as indi-
viduals’ own prior journeys (cf. Hovil 2010: 12–14; IRRI 2018b: 4). Although
some of these are no doubt economic-based or livelihoods-focused, such ration-
ales do not account for the full range of mobilities (cf. Monsutti 2008: 58–59).
This does not mean livelihoods are not important; clearly they are, andmany of
the back-and-forth movements in this region are intimately connected with
obtaining not only food—without a doubt the most important consideration
for most of our interlocutors—but other aspects of individual and familial con-
tinuity: jobs, money, healthcare, schooling, spouses, and so on. However, as this
short list already demonstrates, the everyday political economy for many refugees
is wider than standard humanitarian conceptualizations of ‘livelihoods’ allow,
encompassing an extensive range of sociocultural and relational connections.
As Allen (1996: 7) has argued, failure to account for diversity of movement
would be to ‘give a false . . . impression that one is dealing with a simple and well-
circumscribed event rather than with an untidy process, involving multiple, and
sometimes overlapping migrations in both directions’. Nonetheless, although
many of the people we spoke with undeniably take part in multiple, intercon-
nected movements—across the border, throughout Uganda, or beyond—those
undertaken by many refugees frequently remain irregular and unpredictable,
largely because of a multitude of factors over which they have little control or
certainty.
We suggest that the irregular and uncertainmobilities so characteristic of South
Sudanese refugees in Uganda not only problematize the one-dimensional direc-
tion and duration of the term ‘repatriation’, but alsomanymore nuanced concepts
such as circular’ (Kaiser 2010: 52), ‘oscillating’ (Allen 1996), or ‘pendular’
(REACH2018a: 4). Although thesemore nuanced concepts do correctly highlight
spatial and temporal multiplicity, they tend to assume one or more underlying
regularities, as well as a certain amount of existential certainty and predictability.
Accordingly, we define the ‘pragmatic mobilities’ of our interlocutors as ‘the ex-
perience and practice of multiple, distinct yet interconnected mobilities, despite
trying times and unknowable circumstances’, thereby attending to the sometimes
fractured (dis)junctures between journeys as well as to their full temporal and
geographical scope. We argue that this conceptualization highlights the inherent
complexity of refugees’ mobilities, allowing for movements which take place over
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weeks or seasons as much as lives, as well as to additional places beyond either an
assumed final destination or a supposed point of origin. Significantly, it empha-
sizes that in even the most trying existential circumstances, some refugees can still
engage in directed if sometimes spontaneous and sporadic movements.Moreover,
it allows that these movements are illustrative of refugees’ agentive capacities
more generally, as well as connecting the underlying imperatives of these move-
ments to that more general human endeavour to act within and upon the essential
uncertainties of one’s life, no matter its surroundings (cf. Finnström 2008).
Background: History, Location, Methods
Uganda and Sudan/South Sudan have been hosting each other’s refugees since at
least the 1950s, with large numbers of people from both countries spending sig-
nificant periods in the other (Akol 1994: 77–78; Allen 1996: 226–228). The first
significant repatriation in southern Sudan took place when thousands of refugees
returned after the Addis AbabaAgreement ended the First SudaneseWar in 1972.
At the time, this was ‘one of the largest repatriation operations on the African
continent’ (Akol 1994: 78). Other large repatriations followed the signing of the
CPA in 2005 and the creation of the independent country of South Sudan on 9
July 2011 (Hovil 2010: 12–14; Kaiser 2010: 45–47). These returns were by no
means temporally or spatially simple, however: some South Sudanese refugees
refused to repatriate while many who did soon fled again, becoming refugees once
more.
Most currently displaced South Sudanese derive from the ongoing conflict
which erupted in December 2013. This conflict has killed hundreds of thousands
(Checci et al., 2018) while nearly 4 million people have been displaced, half of
whom are children (OCHA 2016: 2). By 2016, South Sudan was the world’s third
largest refugee crisis and the largest inAfrica (OCHA2016: 1). There are now over
2.2 million South Sudanese in exile, 860,000 of whom are hosted in Uganda
(UNHCR 2019b), the world’s third largest refugee-hosting nation (UNHCR
2019a: 6). Nearly all Uganda’s refugees live in one of 30 refugee settlements in
eleven districts (REACH 2018b: 2, 7; UNHCR 2019a: 6), although there are small
numbers of self-settled, urban refugees.
Underpinned by the rights enshrined in the 2006 Refugees Act and the 2010
Refugee Regulations, Uganda’s legislation has garnered significant attention for
its allegedly refugee-friendly nature. Under these provisions, all South Sudanese in
Uganda have prima facie refugee status (UNHCR2019a: 7) and are entitled to the
same basic services as citizens, as well as some freedom ofmovement and rights to
employment and business ownership (UN and WBG 2017: 2). Such rights are
often practically unavailable, however, either due to a lack of settlement-based
services (Kaiser 2006: 601; UNHCR 2019a: 6); because basic humanitarian assist-
ance targets rural settlements to the detriment of urban refugees (IRRI 2018b: 7);
because of the local interpretation and implementation of law (IRRI 2018a: 4); or
because many settlements’ rural surroundings suffer from chronic underdevelop-
ment, effectively encamping residents (IRRI 2018a: 4; Kaiser 2006: 601, 620).
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However, we will argue that these problems may not be quite so relevant for
residents of PRS, in the northernDistrict of Lamwo (Figure 1), as those in some of
Uganda’s other settlements. The newest ofUganda’s refugee settlements, PRSwas
opened on 12 April 2017 following an unexpected influx of South Sudanese
refugees east of the Nile from late 2016 (UNHCR 2017: 1). As PRS chanced to
open almost immediately after a SudanPeoples’ LiberationArmy/InGovernment
(SPLA/IG) attack on the Acholi-speaking community of Pajok inMagwi County
on 3 April 2017, Pajok’s refugees became PRS’s first residents, with over 5,000
settling in PRS by 15 April (OPM and UNHCR 2017: 1). Although it is planned
that PRS will eventually house 100,000 people (UNHCR 2017: 1), the population
at the end of fieldwork inNovember 2018 it was approximately 34,000while it was
52,022 by the end of 2019 (UNHCR 2019b). All residents of PRS are South
Sudanese, primarily from Acholi- and Lotuko-speaking areas (UNHCR 2018).
Especially prevalent are those from the Acholi-speaking community of Pajok.
This article is grounded in 12 months ethnographic fieldwork undertaken over
2017 and 2018. Our research proceeded from the methodological premise that
‘direct dialogue with others, afford[s] opportunities to explore knowledge . . . as an
intersubjective process of sharing experience, comparing notes, exchanging ideas,
and finding common ground’ (Jackson 1996: 9). As Finnström (2015: S224) has
argued, ‘we build our ethnography by way of the relationships that we establish in
the process’. Rather than just asking questions, we therefore spent time and effort
building close interpersonal relationships in an attempt to ‘minimize the distance
between the researcher and the researched’ (Grabska 2014: 15). Our findings de-
rive from the strength and quality of these relationships.
To achieve the relationships required, we prioritized the parts of life our inter-
locutors deemed most essential and spent significant time engaging in the type of
everyday activities James Clifford (1997: 56) might have called ‘deep hanging out’:
compound maintenance, the collection and preparation of food, sitting and talk-
ing, and eating and drinking.Moreover, each author has a longer personal history
of living and working with South Sudanese. O’Byrne’s doctoral research was
conducted in Pajok during 2013–14, where he was adopted into the Bobi sub-
clan and became ‘a Bobi boy’ and ‘a son of Agola Kapuk’ (a Pajok-specific mwoc
or ‘praise name’). His son was later named by Bobi elders according to Acholi
custom. Ogeno originates from Pajok, and he spent his childhood living in
Kyangwali Refugee Settlement inHoimaDistrict (Figure 1). There he lived along-
side some of the same people now living in PRS, many of whom are close friends
or family. Thus, both authors have (‘real’ or ‘fictive’) kin and other connections to
PRS residents or their families, and a major impetus for this study were the stories
we heard before research began.
These relationships allowed privileged access to much sensitive information.
These same relationships also introduce a potential weakness, however: an over-
reliance onAcholi voices to the neglect of other groups. In our defence, at the time
of fieldwork around 70% of PRS’s residents were from Acholi-speaking South
Sudan, while refugee leadership was closer to 80–85%. The other main ethnic
groups in PRS (the predominantly agro-pastoralist Langi andLotuko) come from
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a much larger, famine and drought stuck but relatively conflict-safe area further
east in Eastern Equatoria, beginning in the eastern foothills of the Imatong ranges
and extending as far as the Ethiopian and Kenyan borders. These refugees often
paid significant amounts for safe transport to the Ugandan border point and, due
to the basic lack of income generating activities within PRS, over the period of our
research generally could not afford the transportation fees required to engage in
temporary or irregular returns to their former communities.
Given these demographic variations, differences in ethnic mobility were more
matters of geography and available money than ethnic-based identities, relations,
Figure 1.
Map of Uganda showing refugee hosting districts (Source: REACH 2018b: 4).
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and expectations. Even so, to rectify any problems with representation, we spent
significant effort diversifying the ethnic base of our primary interlocutors in mid-
late 2018. Nonetheless, the majority of our interlocutors remained Acholi South
Sudanese, more specifically from Ayaci and Magwi Counties, and especially
Pajok. Moreover, given the location of PRS in an Acholi-speaking area of
Uganda, PRS itself has a decidedly Acholi feel: we were at many formal events
where Acholi was the only language spoken, especially beyond the gates of the
mainUNHCR/NGOcompound, and both the surroundingUgandan community
and themajority of NGO staff are all Acholi. It is also the native tongue ofOgeno.
When needing non-Acholi language translation, we simply did what UNHCR
does, too: approach refugee leadership and request use of their own preferred
translator(s).
Examples of the types of events we observed include: food aid delivery across
multiple Food Distribution Cycles (FDCs) both before and after the UNHCR
biometric verification exercise which ran fromApril to June 2018 (BVE, for more
information see below); awide array of stakeholdermeetings; theRefugeeWelfare
Council elections in July and August 2018; and a number of church, clan, family,
school, or other gatherings. Beyond ethnography, numerous formal, semi-formal,
and informal interviews were also conducted, with NGO, OPM, and UNHCR
employees as well as across both the refugee and host communities. Further, a
total of 50 open-ended questionnaires on individual mobility practices was admin-
istered to Acholi and Lotuko refugees across each of PRS’s eight zones.
Nonetheless, deeper investigation is needed into the connections between various
types of refugee mobility and their direction, duration, and rationale. Further
studies could benefit from undertaking more longitudinal perspectives, especially
life history methodologies or cohort-based forms of observational study.
The Everyday Pragmatics of Mobility Among South Sudanese Refugees in
Uganda
During our research, it was apparent that cross-border movements between
Uganda and South Sudan continued throughout the recent conflict, despite
South Sudan being unsafe. Our findings suggest that a combination of regional
variation in South Sudan’s wider conflict dynamics and the specific location and
demographic composition of PRS were the primary factors allowing many of
these cross-border mobilities undertaken. Thus, throughout the period of our
fieldwork, and although much of the rest of South Sudan remained unsafe, one
obvious distinction between PRS and many of Uganda’s other refugee receiving
locations is that the majority of PRS’s residents originated from the Ugandan/
South Sudan borderlands east of the Equatorian Nile. In fact, except for the one
major SPLA/IG attack upon the community of Pajok in April 2017, these areas
were generally safer from large-scale violence than most other refugee-producing
regions. Return was therefore easier for these refugees than those whose origins
were located further away or who had to pass through more conflict-affected
regions. This is especially true for those areas directly north of Lamwo District
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from which PRS’s numerically dominant Acholi-speaking residents derived. This
finding affirms similar patterns among Equatorian refugees in Uganda’s north-
west settlements (REACH 2018a: 5).
This combination of (relative) peace and proximity meant that, during our
research, cross-border mobility was definitely possible, if neither predictable nor
entirely normal (although as we note below, it became increasingly common with
the progress of the peace process). As with Afghani refugees in central Asia
(Monsutti 2008: 59), South Sudanese might also return across the border for
reasons ranging across the full gamut of personal, familial, sociocultural, political,
and economic registers. In no particular order, the most common reasons among
our interlocutors were: to visit friends and family; to collect objects left behind
(usually for small business enterprises); to engage in cultivation (often on land
close to the border so access was cheaper and easier); to gather information about
possible future repatriation; or perhaps most commonly, to attend a funeral or
accompany a body returning for burial (cf. Hovil 2010: 6; Kaiser 2010: 52;
REACH 2018a: 4).
Often the reasons underlying seemingly divergent mobilities are interlinked, as
for one young woman we spoke with in November 2018. Amy—like all names
used, this is a pseudonym—had just returned from accompanying the body of her
uncle back to Acholi South Sudan and, knowing our interest in cross-border
movement, was happy to talk with us. She said that, if they can afford it, refugees
originating from close to the border prefer to take family ‘back home to be buried’
rather than intern them in the settlement cemetery. There were several reasons for
this, she said, but not only was the settlement cemetery ‘too full and the remaining
pieces too close to the river [a stream running east-west through PRS]’ but host
community ‘land lords do not allow refugees to bury the dead ones within the
residential plots’ as they would in South Sudan. She also told us that some families
were denied burial ‘if they did not first pay the landlord for the body’, citing the
example of her neighbour, whose landlord demandedUGX2,000,000 (£420/$540)
for the polluting presence of a deceased person on his land. ‘Better to pay to take
that body back than give the money to someone else’, she said.
People’s attitudes to movement also changed frequently, often within the space
of a single week. One notable example of attitudinal change took place not long
after early progress in theRevitalizedAgreement on theResolution of theConflict
in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) peace initiative, during the period of 2018’s June and
July ‘short dry’ (‘oro matidi’), when communities of the region begin preparations
for the year’s second agricultural season. Reminiscent of exactly those type of
seasonally-based, agriculturally-defined movements that had distinguished their
pre-refugee lives—when entire families might go and stay in their bush gardens for
a period of several weeks to try and best ensure a productive growing season—
many PRS households continued to engage in similar seasonal movements, des-
pite becoming refugees, and many families told us their sons had ‘gone back to
South Sudan to open up new gardens’ (cf. REACH 2018a: 4–5).
This included Bosco, a paternal cousin of Ogeno. In July 2018, his mother
informed us he had left PRS to begin preparations on the family’s sesame fields
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in Pajok. She said this would not only bring an important source of income but
would provide some much needed dietary diversity. The family’s hope was short-
lived, however: Bosco soon returned with the news that the SPLA/IG had
deployed new regiments to the area, composed of unknown and ethnically-
different soldiers. Recent experiences had taught the population that such deploy-
ments camewith increased civilian predation.Not long afterwards the other youth
who had travelled to South Sudan also returned to PRS, bringing word of an
escalation in army-related theft and violence. Moreover, their cultivation efforts
were largely unsuccessful, significantly affecting dietary diversity, livelihood suc-
cess, and basic cash flow in the settlement and beyond.
As in any community, some people in PRS travel more frequently or for longer
periods than others, and in Palabek this demonstrated very obvious class dimen-
sions. Indeed, many useful indicators of social differentiation can be found within
variations in who chooses to move, to where, how often, and for how long (cf.
Kaiser 2010; Grabska 2014). For Acholi residents of PRS during 2017 and early
2018 especially, cross-border movement was more common among those located
at both extremes of the class spectrum and, beyond the seemingly unpredictable
nature of more irregular forms of mobility, had a distinctive class profile: on the
one hand, while some are involved in international business and have dependable
access to vehicular transport and a variety of sought after trade goods, most
people move out of sheer desperation, their mobility induced by uncertainties
around the predictable provision of services in the settlement and the inadequacies
of available resources.
Those on the first side of this class dichotomy are those who exploit the oppor-
tunities of conflict and resettlement for their own advantage. They encapsulate the
positive dimensions of the ambiguities inherent within any refugee situation, dem-
onstrating not only that mobility is possible but that it can be leveraged for one’s
benefit. For these men and women, mobility and wealth help continue access to
the other. Although those few individuals able to engage in repeated, profitable
border crossings were communally glorified, however, the number of people
undertaking suchmovements were actually very few. Thus, wewere told abundant
stories about ‘Owot the Driver’, a man who seemingly lived life on the road,
transporting goods and people—living and dead—back and forth between
Pajok and Palabek. According to these stories, Owot had several wives, multiple
vehicles, and a large disposable income that allowed him to reliably eat meat and
drink beer. Owot was said to be demonstrable proof that mobility was not only
possible but profitable. However, as Owot was able tomobilize a level of personal
wealth not accessible to most PRS residents, the experience of him and others like
him does not greatly represent the majority of the community.
Nonetheless, those at the other end of the class spectrum were always more
common, andmore commonly discussed. Thiswas especially true fromNovember
2017 through to the completion of the UNHCR biometric verification exercise
(BVE) in April 2018. Indeed, the majority seemed among the most marginalized
and peripheral of the refugee community: near destitution; perhaps suffering from
the many physical or psychological ailments associated with conflict and post-
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conflict life; possibly a widow, orphan, or some other UNHCR-designated PSN
(Person with Special Needs). For many of these, perhaps best called ‘quasi-refu-
gees’, life in a refugee settlement was simply too fragile to be bearable: despite their
prima facie status, for various personal or political reasons they had either failed to
officially register with the OPM or could not afford the bribe money necessary to
do so (cf. Ogeno and O’Byrne 2018). Unable to afford life in the settlement, and
without food, money, health services, or other humanitarian assistance, sheer
desperation drove these forgotten refugees back to the uncertainties of life in
South Sudan. When our interlocutors told us about these returnees, mobility
was portrayed as dangerous rather than glorious, often resulting in serious set-
backs or even death for those in pursuit of life’s basic necessities. Their stories
always noted these people had only ‘returned home’ because of the deplorable
conditions of their settlement-based lives, the pain they individually experienced a
form of symbolic analogue for the existential anxiety of the refugee collective.
Given the basic ‘protection’ parameters of UNHCR’s mandate and operation,
ensuring timely and problem-free food distribution should be fundamental. In
PRS, however, this was not always the case: at least until the BVE stabilized
humanitarian assistance in April 2018, lack of dependable food provision was
the single greatest concern of most residents. Although the World Food
Programme’s (WFP) food distribution seemed taken for granted by most camp
authorities and humanitarian actors, including UNHCR and the OPM, it certain-
ly was not among refugees. In fact, missing or delayed food aid seemed one of the
defining features of settlement life and we were repeatedly told it was the primary
reason someone would leave relative safety in Uganda for uncertainty and danger
in South Sudan. Various refugee leaders also showed us multiple abandoned
compounds, telling us their owners had been among those denied food and other
humanitarian assistance and, given the circumstances, had decided their best
chance of survival was to return to living in a country beset by a volatile conflict
involving gross, civilian-directed violence.
Regrettably, as with most informal migrations, evidence for this humanitarian
failure-induced mobility is largely anecdotal. Nonetheless, we heard variations of
this phenomenon from refugee leaders within six of the settlement’s eight zones at
various stages through late 2017 and early 2018, as well as from multiple refugees
themselves. All these repeated near-identical situations and outcomes and, unfor-
tunately, these stories nearly always ended badly as well, with the migrant’s un-
timely death (cf. REACH 2018a: 4–5). These dangerous informal repatriations
were not unknown toUNHCRor settlement officials, either, as wewere present at
several large meetings during which refugee leaders complained about the effects
of unpredictable food delivery. Furthermore, one unusually forthright UNHCR
representative told us:
These refugees move a lot, sometimes back to South Sudan or Kiryandongo
(Refugee Settlement) . . . Our refugee policy says once someone crosses the border
back into their country, they lose the status of being a refugee. But people do return
back without informing the authorities. You see, it is true that, because of the
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problems getting food, the refugees find life difficult in the settlement. So they go
back to South Sudan to do farming and business, to get money and food (UNHCR
Official, August 2018).
Although some NGO staff and refugee leaders may have portrayed the diverse
mobilities of PRS residents in rather simplistic and generalizing terms, most ref-
ugees moved because of a combination of factors. Poverty, insecurity, and general
existential uncertainty were among the most common of a range of intersecting
rationales, and certainly a lack of dependable cash flowmeant that even relatively
unreliable opportunities to access money were seized upon. In understanding the
complex interplay between competing needs and rationale, the story of a Lotuko
woman called Agnes proves particularly instructive, highlighting the ways that
personal rationalizations of everyday and future needs intersect with individual
and household uncertainties and (in)securities.
We first met Agnes in late 2017, when she approached us after an NGO live-
lihoods workshop, presuming us to be NGO staff and seeking our support with
the non-delivery of food aid. Agnes became one of our primary interlocutors, but
towards the end of 2018, she suddenly returned to South Sudan for a period of
several weeks. When we finally located her again, she told us she had been away
due to a new business venture: as the local go-between for a probably illegal
international logging business, one that took trees from areas of southern South
Sudan depopulated by violence to sell to foreign speculators in Kampala. When
we asked her why she had done what she did, her answer was telling:
I went looking for a better life because life here is too difficult. No food, no resour-
ces, nothing. Most of these organisations are not willing to help us out of our situ-
ation—they come and ask questions and they end there, they do not want to assist
[. . .] This is why I got involved in this business, because if I do not do something
nobody will help my children (South Sudanese refugee woman, October 2018).
However, despite spending several weeks living away from her children in the
South Sudanese bush, an objective assessment of this venture might say it was
largely unsuccessful. As well as bribes paid to police, soldiers, border guards, and
government officials on both sides of the border, Agnes’ Kampala-based business
associates demanded all costs were paid from her own profits. Furthermore, al-
though she had not died, her experience was distinctly unpleasant: as well as being
generally sick and hungry for much of the time, she implied she had been forced
into non-consensual sexual activity. Despite her best efforts, she barely broke
even, hardly covering the money she owed her neighbours for feeding her children
while away.
Not all refugee movements involve crossing borders, however, and the majority
of those undertaken by PRS residents meant travelling to different places within
Uganda, often for extended periods. For example, many teenage boys (especially,
although not exclusively) are undertaking secondary education in northern
Ugandan boarding schools, and the seasonal variation within their mobility pat-
terns is that of the Ugandan education system rather than the agricultural cycle.
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Likewise, any number of individuals may transit backwards and forwards be-
tween PRS and the primary northern towns of Kitgum or Gulu for health or
business-related purposes.
Moreover, due to their experience as refugees during the Second SudaneseWar,
most Acholi-speaking adults in PRS have previously lived in at least oneUgandan
refugee settlement. Indeed, a substantial number continue to maintain houses,
farms, families, or businesses in or nearby these settlements. This is particularly
true for the area around Kiryandongo Refugee Settlement, home to significant
numbers of Acholi South Sudanese during the 1990s and 2000s (Kaiser 2006,
2010). Although most repatriated following the CPA, some self-settled in the
area around nearby Bweyale town, and visits to friends and family remaining in
that region make up a significant portion of the Ugandan-based movements of
PRS’s Acholi-speaking refugees. In October 2017, one elderly Acholi man from
Pajok told us ‘because I still have a wife living on our land down there [in the
Bweyale area] from before [during their time as refugees in the Second Sudanese
War], I will try to go down there every two or three months, if I can afford it’.
Others repeated similar patterns (cf. REACH 2018a: 5).
However, these movements were severely curtailed over the first half of 2018: a
scandal involving the systematic inflation of refugee numbers rocked theUgandan
refugee industry in early 2018, resulting in substantial international fallout and
threats of reduced funding from donor organizations and countries. In response,
between March and September 2018 UNHCR instituted the organization’s larg-
est ever biometric registration and verification programme, the Biometric
Verification Exercise or BVE. Seeking to quantify the true number of
Ugandan-based refugees, the BVE used iris scanning and finger printing technol-
ogy to count each refugee once and only once, reducing the possibility of corrup-
tion and theft on the part of either refugees or humanitarian staff, and tying the
allocation and distribution of all food and other humanitarian assistance to the
final outcome.
One result of the BVE was a series of significant changes in how food was
processed, distributed, and accounted for. In PRS, this meant that from June
2018, camp authorities (the OPM, UNHCR, and WFP) began insisting all refu-
gees could only collect food aid from a single specified collection point within their
own zone on one particular day per monthly delivery cycle. As well as the con-
tinuing irregularity of distribution days—as before the BVE, it could still be the
start of the month during one cycle but the end or middle of the month during
another—food collection was suddenly now only available to persons older than
14 who could provide valid biometric data on that specific day, with the precise
day for distribution usually made public less than a week before food delivery
began. Because of these changes, it was no longer possible for friends, extended
kin, or even refugee leaders to collect food for absentees, as they had been able to
under the previous card-based system. The BVE therefore not only had a negative
effect on those who had not been able to correctly register (most of whomnow lost
any ability to access food or other humanitarian services) but also upon the gen-
eral intra-Ugandan mobility of settlement residents, significantly reducing the
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duration and frequency of previously common inter-settlement movements. After
the new food distribution rules came into play in June 2018, the same elderly
Acholi man quoted above told us that ‘because of this thing [the BVE], now I
can no longer go down [to Bweyale] to seemywife there, because if I do Imaymiss
out on the distribution here, and then I will not eat’.
Refugees do not only think about their present lives and movements, however
(cf. Hovil 2010; Kaiser 2010): they also consider those in the future, whether back
to their place of origin, a location from an earlier refugee experience, or to visit or
live close to friends and family elsewhere in the same receiving country. Indeed,
many South Sudanese continue to move to and from various Ugandan locations
for a variety of often mundane reasons during the course of their everyday lives,
and the same is true of those who remain in South Sudan. As noted earlier, many
residents of PRS have visited compatriots across Uganda multiple times during
their most recent flight, some of whom live in the same settlements as during a
previous displacement. In all cases, and much like movements taking place
throughout the recent past and present, individual and communal analyses about
peace, proximity, and (un)predictability seem to be the most important consid-
erations involved in planning potential future movements.
Concerns about security are especially significant, as many plans for the future
depend upon the success of R-ARCSS, South Sudan’s current but fragile and
unpredictable peace process. Although several attempts were made to end the
recent war, from the outset PRS residents deemed that R-ARCSS was somehow
qualitatively different. Early progress only confirmed this, and it is undeniable
that the number of those making temporary visits across the border increased
substantially following its signing in September 2018. In fact, over the November
2018 toMarch 2019dry season, many of thosemaking the crossing began remain-
ing in South Sudan for longer periods. Some of these visits may even have adopted
a more semi-permanent form, although changes in patterns of mobility were ap-
parent even before this. Nonetheless, even those who seemed to be most proactive
about undertaking longer or multiple cross-border journeys generally still
remained cautious about the future.
Take, for example, Paul.Oneof our closest interlocutors, Paulwas anewlymarried
man in his early thirties who had worked closely with O’Byrne during his PhD
fieldwork.He also owned his ownmotorcycle and used this to return to Pajok several
times over the last half of 2018. The first time he crossed the border, in August 2018,
he told us he went ‘just to go for a visit, to see what was happening, and return back
[to Uganda]’. This was followed not long after by an overnight trip for a burial, and
then another trip in October 2018, to help a friend visit their family. Just before we
finished fieldwork he went again, this time to clear his gardens for planting in early
2019, and he said he hoped to go back and forth several times during the 2018–19dry
season. He would not take his family back, however, because:
In Pajok there are still too many soldiers. And it is scaring us to return, because we
fear the soldiers. They are still sometimes raping women. Some men are returning,
but they are living with fear, because of the soldiers. People there do not talk about
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peace at all . . . because if you talk about peace to them [the soldiers] it means you
support the rebels. So we do not know what the future will hold (South Sudanese
male refugee, November 2018).
There is significant risk attached to these and any returns, however: as everyone
recognizes, the peace process is (and remains) fragile. And, as almost all our
interlocutors acknowledge, there have been other ceasefires, some of which they
also thought might ‘stick’. Consequently, as with Paul, most people took a prag-
matic approach toR-ARCSS’s fragility and whether or not they would repatriate.
These feelings were widespread, and continued for months after R-ARCSS was
initially signed. For example, during an unrelated conversation in late January
2019, the Refugee Welfare Council Chairman (the refugees’ primary elected rep-
resentative or RWC) told Ogeno that:
Many people are returning to South Sudan illegally, without informingUNHCRor
the OPM. They return illegally as they want to keep their refugee status, because
they don’t knowwhat will happen in South Sudan, even after this peace agreement.
On the other side, many who left earlier are crossing back into Uganda. The driving
force is famine in South Sudan and access to better social services in Uganda, like
education and health. There are also more new arrivals coming and they are fleeing
because for the same reasons. And now people are starting to become unsure about
the current peace deal (Refugee Welfare Council Chairman, January 2019).
As the RWC astutely noted, fear of renewed violence in South Sudan was not
the only reason driving people to seek refuge in Uganda, nor was it the only issue
which worried returnees: they were also concerned about losing their refugee sta-
tus (cf. Hovil 2010: 12; Kaiser 2010: 54). As Kaiser (2010: 57) noted following the
Second Sudanese War, such fears are intimately interconnected. Given refugees’
very real concerns about how the lives of themselves and their families might be
effected by unknown or unpredictable elements beyond their immediate control, it
is little wonder they were reluctant to give up the benefits of being a refugee. After
all, beyond personal or physical security, being a legally enrolled and verified
refugee in Uganda brings not only food and security but health services and
‘free’ primary-level education, none of which are readily available in rural south-
ern South Sudan. This is why people told us that, for the great majority, perman-
ent return was between three and five years away, if R-ARCSS continues to hold.
Moreover, repatriation would begin by sending young men to open gardens and
build homes first, while the rest of the family—especially students and the sick,
weak, and aged—remained in Uganda to maintain households, compounds and
refugee status (cf. Hovil 2010: 16; Kaiser 2010: 55). Nonetheless, even in this
circumstance, nearly everyone we spoke with said repatriation would comprise
much cross-border back-and-forth. Thus, even in the case of future UNHCR-
assisted repatriations, PRS residents will generally maintain the refugee status of
some family members for as long as possible, allowing a return to Palabek and a
certain amount of certainty should life in South Sudan prove—perhaps predict-
ably, given recent experiences—too violent or difficult.
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Conclusion: Pragmatic Mobilities, Uncertainty, and Refugee Agency
This article has outlined some of the various and diverse everyday mobilities of
South Sudanese in Uganda, predominantly through the lens of Acholi-speaking
refugees in PRS in the country’s northern Lamwo District. Cross-border move-
ments between Uganda and South Sudan have continued throughout the current
conflict, despite South Sudan being unsafe, and we have demonstrated that the
complex interactions between refugees’ seemingly distinct and divergent move-
ments have important implications for how displacement-based mobilities are
conceptualized and understood. In an attempt to capture the temporal, geograph-
ical and existential scope of these journeys, as well as their fractured (dis)junctures,
we have defined these journeys as ‘pragmatic mobilities’, that is, as ‘the experience
and practice of multiple, distinct yet interconnected journeys, despite trying times
and unknowable circumstances’. We have also argued that these pragmatic mobi-
lities practices are particularly powerful manifestations of agency, seeking to at
least allow for the possibility of greater personal and collective control in other-
wise uncertain contexts.
In the case of refugees in PRS, at least, the complex rationales through which
most refugees try to bring a certain element of predictability to their uncertain
mobilities are diverse and involve a combination of factors, with the most signifi-
cant including: regional variation in conflict-related violence, with movement to
areas of relatively safety likely to occur more frequently; the precise proximity of
the locations being left and returned to and some closeness of connection to the
place or the people who reside there; and specific refugee community demograph-
ics, with more permanent movements more common among young men and
refugees at either end of the class spectrum. Thus, unless it were for the purposes
of a funeral and burial, most of PRS’s mobile population either generally returned
to their most recently inhabited location in rural southern South Sudan during the
November to March dry season, or went to visit friends or family in another
Ugandan refugee settlement, with most journeys taking place for a period of
only a few days.
We have also argued that the complexity and diversity of PRS residents’ ‘un-
certain’ multiple mobilities have more or less ‘irregular’ or ‘rhythmic’ forms.
Although the great majority of movements undertaken were irregular or once-
off visits to one place or another, some definitely hadmore ‘rhythmic’ dimensions,
and some of the former even became the latter over time and through repetition.
Alongside their expected differences around the frequency and length of move-
ments undertaken, ‘irregular’ and ‘rhythmic’ forms of ‘uncertain’ mobility share
many similarities, including a variety of geographical (location returned to), tem-
poral (duration of the visit), and seasonal (time of year) dimensions. The major
differences between ‘irregular’ and more regular or ‘rhythmic’ movements were
simply that the latter tended to be of a more enduring nature and practiced by a
smaller number of individuals for more explicitly economic rationales. Moreover,
‘rhythmic’ returns aremore likely to include a lengthier stay at the place of arrival,
perhaps demonstrating some element of longer-term commitment to both the
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place being returned to as well as the very act or promise of mobility itself. Thus,
although irregular or once-off movements might be more common in terms of the
number of people practising them, they are almost necessarily uncertain in nature,
while the more regular nature of ‘rhythmic’ mobilities that frequently and perhaps
even repeatedly follow similar patterns or pathways lend them a certain
predictability.
We end by providing the following, empirically-based conclusions and recom-
mendations: Firstly, it is important to note that the contemporary cross-border
mobilities of PRS residents seem intimately connected to the unique location of
PRS vis a vis South Sudan and must not be conflated with either voluntary re-
patriation or any greater sense of personal security. This is due to several reasons,
many of which do not easily or directly transfer to lives of those living in some
other Ugandan refugee settlements. After all, most PRS residents originate in
areas directly north of Lamwo District, and so the border area and its legal and
less legal crossing routes are well-known from residents’ pre-exile lives.
Furthermore, most residents share a language with their Ugandan hosts and
are able to pass themselves off as a Ugandan if required. Moreover, as well as
these returns being relatively quick, easy, and cheap, the ‘home’ areas being
returned to are at least relatively free of localized violence. This makes them
safe to visit, if not entirely safe for extended durations. In other words, they are
more predictable, less uncertain. The mobility patterns found in PRS should not
necessarily be expected to be repeated elsewhere, especially when these basic
dimensions are not shared, and must remain a matter of empirical discovery.
Such considerations should also be taken into account when planning and imple-
menting future policy or research initiatives.
Similarly of note is that some of the most experientially significant movements
in a refugee’s life are not at first obvious or perhaps even expected, for example,
those relating to life’s end. Indeed, death-related mobility was so common in PRS
that ‘returning’ a body to its native soil, to be buried where it ‘belongs’, is an
important yet underappreciated facet of refugees’ movements. These mobilities
are also important manifestations of refugees’ agency and place-making practices:
by acting where possible to return their deceased, they take advantage of the
opportunities and paradoxes within local governance regimes to temporarily visit
areas of origin and belonging. In this way, continuity of life, meaning, and con-
nection aremaintained, despite other uncertainties. Further research into refugees
mortuary and funeral practices is therefore suggested, especially death’smigratory
or transnational dimensions.
Moreover, the ways in which residents of PRS speak about and practice returns
to and from South Sudan are often framed through the positive and negative
experiences of uncertainty and unpredictability within life in exile. As Grabska
(2014: 6) has noted, ‘the visions for the future and the imagined homes that women
and men long for are shaped according to their experiences in the specific frame-
work of refugee camps’. Thus, despite the somewhat unique proximity to point of
origin and return of PRS in the Ugandan refugee context, many who repatriated
did not do so because they wanted to ‘return home’ at the precise time they left.
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Rather, they did so because of the problems of resettlement life. This is especially
true for those who experienced difficulties accessing the basic food aid to which
they should have been entitled. UNHCR and other humanitarian providers and
governance actors in the refugee industry must therefore ensure their registration,
verification, and distribution practices are transparent, accountable, and humane,
with resources actually reaching the designated refugees.
Likewise, there is a problematic dissonance in the fact someone can be South
Sudanese and legally holding prima facie refugee status and yet not be able to
claim either that status or the protections it affords, simply because the Ugandan
refugee authorities seem to find it logistically easier to insist all refugees are ‘prop-
erly’ biometrically-enrolled either at a border or during a time-limited and arbi-
trarily defined period within one of the settlements. Again, like many of the
failings of the Ugandan refugee industry, in not disputing the legality of these
requirements, UNHCR seems to have chosen a smooth operational environment
over either international human rights legislation or its own mandates around
protection. Similarly, from a human rights perspective, the changes brought about
by the BVE hasmeant that UNHCR andWFP have effectively removed the same
refugees’ rights to freedom of movement enshrined in both Ugandan law and
international human rights legislation and about which they have been so vocally
supportive of the Ugandan government.
Finally, transformations in how, when, and why displaced people move are
instructional: along with the existential difficulties of settlement life, perhaps the
most important parameters affecting South Sudanese refugees’ cross-border
mobilities were a reduction in localized violence at the destination and the uncer-
tain institution of a perhaps temporary peace. The likelihood of any large-scale,
future repatriation therefore depends upon the stability and success of this peace,
with a return to either widespread or extreme violence limiting future returns. This
demonstrates the continuing importance of the international community in South
Sudan’s peacebuilding efforts and we recommend that international resources are
directed not only towards the provision of security, justice, or the rule of law but
also in developing infrastructure within the war-effected rural areas that many
refugees left and to which they might return. After all, without significant, local-
ized rural investment, repatriationmay ultimately prove unsustainable. And with-
out the predictability of a safe and sustainable return, will mobility not only
continue to ‘be seen as a key livelihood strategy’ (Monsutti 2008: 58) but as a
fundamental means of ensuring existential certainty.
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FINNSTRÖM, S. (2015) ‘War Stories and Troubled Peace: Revisiting Some Secrets of Northern
Uganda’.Current Anthropology 56(S12): S222–S230.
GRABSKA, K. (2014) Gender, Home and Identity: Nuer Repatriation to Southern Sudan. New York:
James Currey.
HOVIL,L. (2010)Hoping forPeace,AfraidofWar:TheDilemmasofRepatriationandBelongingon the
Borders of Uganda and South Sudan. Geneva:UNHCR,New Issues inRefugeeResearch,Research
Paper 196.
INTERNATIONALREFUGEERIGHTS INITIATIVE (IRRI) (2018a) “My Children Should Stand
Strong to Make Sure We Get Our Land Back”: Host Community Perspectives of Uganda’s Lamwo
RefugeeSettlement.Kampala: InternationalRefugeeRights Initiative,Rights inExilePolicyPaper.
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE (IRRI) (2018b) Uganda’s Refugee Policies:
TheHistory, thePolitics, theWayForward.Kampala: InternationalRefugeeRights Initiative, Rights
in Exile Policy Paper.
JACKSON, M. D. (1996) Things as They Are: New Directions in Phenomenological Anthropology.
Bloomington, ID: Indiana University Press
KAISER, T. (2006) ‘Between a Camp and a Hard Place: Rights, Livelihood and Experiences of the
Local Settlement System for Long-Term Refugees in Uganda’. The Journal of Modern African
Studies 44(4): 597–621.
KAISER, T. (2010) ‘Dispersal, Division and Diversification: Durable Solutions and Sudanese
Refugees in Uganda’. Journal of Eastern African Studies 4(1): 44–60.
LONG, K. (2010) Home Alone? A Review of the Relationship between Repatriation, Mobility and
Durable Solutions for Refugees. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Policy Development and Evaluation Service (PDES).
MONSUTTI, A. (2008) ‘Afghan Migratory Strategies and the Three Solutions to the Refugee
Problem’.Refugee Survey Quarterly 27(1): 58–73.
O’BYRNE,R. J. (2017)BecomingChristian:Personhood andMoralCosmology inAcholi SouthSudan,
PhD Thesis in Social Anthropology, University College London.






/jrs/article/33/4/747/6133609 by guest on 12 M
ay 2021
OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER (OPM) and THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) (2017) Inter-agency Update 1st-15th April
2017. Emergency Update on the South Sudan Refugee Situation—Uganda. Kampala: OPM and
UNHCR.
OGENO, C. andO’BYRNE, R. J. (2018) The Illegal Economy of Refugee Registration: Insights into
theUgandanRefugee Scandal.Rights inExile:The InternationalRefugeeRights Initiative’sRefugee
Legal Aid Newsletter.
RAMADAN, A. (2013) ‘Spatialising the Refugee Camp’. Transactions of the Institute of British
Geographers 38(1): 65–77.
REACH (2018a)SituationOverview: Regional Displacement of South Sudanese,March 2018. Geneva:
REACH Initiative.
REACH (2018b)UgandaJointMulti-SectorNeedsAssessment: IdentifyingHumanitarianNeedsamong
Refugee and Host Community Populations in Uganda August 2018. Geneva: REACH Initiative.
UNITED NATIONS (UN) and WORLD BANK (WBG) (2017) ReHoPe—Refugee and Host
Population Empowerment: Strategic Framework, Uganda. Geneva: United Nations and World
Bank.
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
(OCHA) (2016)Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan. Juba: United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) (2017) Initial
WASHAssessments in Lamwo Refugee Settlements, 25 February 2017. Kampala: UNHCR.
THEUNITEDNATIONSHIGHCOMMISSIONERFORREFUGEES (UNHCR) (2018)Uganda:




THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) (2019b)
Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Uganda: Uganda Refugee Response, 31 December 2019.
Kampala: OPM and UNHCR.






/jrs/article/33/4/747/6133609 by guest on 12 M
ay 2021
